April 18, 2025, written by
Andrii Minchekov
Synapse Financial Technologies was a U.S. “banking‑as‑a‑service” (BaaS) platform founded in 2014 to power fintech apps by integrating with chartered banks rather than issuing its own charter or holding deposits directly.
Rather than operating as a bank, Synapse partnered with FDIC‑insured banks such as Evolve Bank & Trust and Mercury Bank, exposing end‑user deposits through “for‑the‑benefit‑of” custodial accounts held at those banks. In this model, Synapse provided the API layer, customer onboarding, KYC/AML checks, and ledger‑keeping, while its partner banks provided deposit insurance and regulatory compliance.
In April 2024, Synapse filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after discrepancies emerged between its internal records and the banks’ ledgers, leaving an estimated $65M–$96M of customer funds unaccounted for. Customers of fintech apps built on Synapse (e.g., Juno, Yotta) suddenly found accounts frozen or balances showing negative due to frozen “for‑the‑benefit‑of” accounts. Attempts to transfer Synapse’s assets to another provider (TabaPay) failed when Synapse blocked bank partners’ system access, exacerbating the freeze and prompting lawsuits from both customers and partner banks.
Relying on a SaaS provider’s ledger means a single point of failure: if that provider becomes insolvent or mismanages reconciliation, customer funds—and trust—can vanish overnight. As Synapse showed, even robust compliance processes can’t substitute for direct control: frozen custodial accounts fall outside FDIC insurance when the non‑bank provider collapses.
By maintaining an in‑house ledger tied directly to its own banking charter, a Neobank:
Re‑platforming away from Synapse meant rewriting APIs, migrating customer data, and re‑certifying KYC/AML flows—an expensive, months‑long effort that siphoned engineering resources. Juno in particular admitted it had “very limited visibility” into its own customer balances because Synapse held the canonical ledger, making any migration slow and error‑prone.
Synapse’s downfall exposed key flaws in the BaaS model, leading many neobanks to reconsider pure‑play SaaS and instead build in‑house core banking engines. Meanwhile, Fintech M&A has spiked as smaller players seek acquisition by chartered banks or platform providers with their own ledgers—LinkedIn data shows 2024 fintech deals already surpassing 2023’s pace.